This is the correct answer. Anything proprietary phones home and inserts malicious metadata into pictures that allow others (social media) to know who, when and how the photo was taken.
You can even use the proprietary Pixel Camera on GrapheneOS and just deny network permissions, or if you’re worried about IPC (if you have another networked Google app installed) it can be in its own private space. And then just strip the exif data if you want before sending it anywhere.
Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I guess if you aim well enough, there could be a very long, narrow, non-reflective cylinder in front of the receiver that would block all light that is not coming exactly from the direction of the target satellite.
"If you aim well enough" is doing a ton of work there. Precise real-time optical tracking of a satellite from a moving platform is an extremely difficult problem. Even if the satellite itself is geostationary, it would also have to rotate to keep the "cylinder" pointed in the right direction to maintain signal.
I suppose you could make a "cylinder" or "cone" broad enough that, if the threat was static, could blot-out attempted jamming from only certain regions while staying open facing toward friendly zones.
No, but the airplane it would be talking to does. Hard enough when your transceiver is wide open, if you narrow your FOV to a thin cone in order to block jamming signals, the GEO now has to physically track the airplane somehow.
Either the whole satellite rotates or the transciever is on a mount that can rotate
Unless you plan on having 1 satellite per airplane, something tells me it's harder to constrain the FOV than you might suggest. There's also the small problem of the energy, complexity, & weight of having motorized parts on the satellite (or fine-grained attitude control for the satellite itself to track the craft).
Agreed, my point is it's a lot harder than tiagod made it sound.
It also doesn't account for some kind of mobile jammer making it inside the cone, particularly if it's staring at an adversarial nation where secure comms would be needed the most, but the adversary would have freedom of movement.
To be a little more precise, f is not a camera-specific constant. It's the focal length of the lens. It's a formula that tells you the diameter of the entrance pupil. So at a focal length of 50mm, an aperture value of f/2 means an entrance pupil diameter of 25mm.
But photographers generally just say "f2", meaning an aperture value of two set on the dial of the camera/lens. It's one stop faster (twice as much light) as f/2.8. It'll give you a relatively shallow depth of field, but not as shallow as e.g. f/1.4.
It's a standalone network. Most Portuguese cards are also VISA/Mastercard, but payment terminals may only have a contract with Multibanco, meaning only Portuguese cards are accepted. It's quite common for foreign cards not to be accepted.
Problem with insurance companies measuring risk this way is that local government externalises costs of bad road design to the people who are unfortunate to have to drive there.
Makes you wonder why there aren't more insurance companies out there using their data to lobby local governments to fix their road design. They have all the data to find hotspots, and reducing accidents would increase their margin.
Maybe this would require an insurance company to have outsized market share in a specific area so they are the main beneficiary of the improvement
Which is the reason why it's better to actually cryptographically sign the packages, and put a key in some trusted keystore, where it can actually be verified to belong to the real distributor, as well as proving that the key hasn't been changed in X amount of days/months/years.
Still doesn't address the fact that keys can be stolen, people can be tricked, and the gigantic all-consuming issue of people just being too lazy to go through with verifying anything in the first place. (Which is sadly not really a thing you can blame people for, it takes up time for no easily directly discernable reason other than the vague feeling of security, and I myself have done it many more times than I would like to admit...)
> If the attacker already controls the download link and has a valid https certificate, can't they just modify the published hash as well?
This implies an attacker controlling the server having the certificate's private key or the certificate's private key otherwise being exfiltrated (likely in conjunction with a DNS poisoning attack). There is no way for a network client to defend against this type of TLS[0] compromise.
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